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SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What Artificial 
Intelligence Reveals About the First 
Amendment 
Toni M. Massaro,† Helen Norton†† & Margot E. 
Kaminski††† 
INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2016, Microsoft released a Twitter chatbot 
called MS Tay. MS Tay was described as an Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI)—a learning algorithm—programmed to “learn” how 
to interact with other Twitter users and produce output de-
linked from the original programmers’ control.1 Within twenty-
four hours, Twitter users learned how to game MS Tay’s learn-
ing process. The mass mis-education of MS Tay resulted in 
Holocaust-denying, transphobic, and misogynistic Tweets, 
among others.2 Microsoft quickly ended its experiment.3 
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 1. Sarah Perez, Microsoft Silences Its New A.I. Bot Tay, After Twitter Us-
ers Teach It Racism, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 24, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/ 
2016/03/24/microsoft-silences-its-new-a-i-bot-tay-after-twitter-users-teach-it 
-racism; James Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft’s AI Chatbot To Be a Racist 
Asshole in Less than a Day, The VERGE (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.theverge 
.com/2016/3/24/11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist. 
 2. Perez, supra note 1. In the following Twitter exchange, TayTweets de-
nied the Holocaust: “@ExcaliburLost: .@TayandYou did the Holocaust hap-
pen?”; “@Tayandyou: @ExcaliburLost it was made up (clapping hands emoji).” 
Excalibur Lost (@ExcaliburLost), TWITTER (Mar. 23, 2016, 3:25 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/ExcaliburLost/status/712767221718773761; see also Shane 
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If MS Tay were a human speaker, there is no question that 
her Tweets would receive First Amendment protection. What-
ever your view of the doctrine, and whatever your view of its 
impact on public political discourse, the United States Supreme 
Court has interpreted the First Amendment to protect hateful 
or otherwise offensive speech that does not rise to the level of 
incitement or “true threats.”4 Should the First Amendment sim-
ilarly protect MS Tay’s speech—and the speech of far more 
complex, more autonomous programs perhaps to come?5 
In an earlier work, two of us explained how current free 
speech theory and doctrine support the claim that the First 
Amendment covers speech by “strong AI” (i.e., as-yet-
hypothetical machines that would think and generate expres-
sive content independent of human direction).6 This is because 
First Amendment law increasingly focuses not on protecting 
speakers as speakers but instead on providing value to listen-
ers and constraining the government.7 If we take the logic of 
current First Amendment jurisprudence and theory to its natu-
ral conclusion, MS Tay’s strong AI progeny could have First 
Amendment rights. Siri-ously. 
 
Dingman, How Microsoft’s Friendly Robot Turned into a Racist Jerk in Less 
than 24 Hours, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 24. 2016), http://www.theglobeandmail 
.com/technology/tech-news/how-microsofts-friendly-robot-turned-into-a-racist 
-jerk-in-less-than-24-hours/article29379054 (listing things Tay “learned,” in-
cluding the exchange with Excalibur Lost). MS Tay’s Tweets have since been 
deleted. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (holding that the 
First Amendment protects offensive speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits the reg-
ulation of hate speech as a content-based category of fighting words); Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects political speech that advocates illegal activity unless it is likely to in-
cite imminent illegal action); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) 
(holding that the First Amendment does not protect “true threats” from regu-
lation). 
 5. We refer to these as-yet-hypothetical machines that actually think as 
“strong AIs,” as opposed to “weak AI” machines that act “as if they were intel-
ligent.” STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A 
MODERN APPROACH 1020 (3d ed. 2010); see also Harry Surden, Machine 
Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 97 (2014) (describing ways in which 
machines can “learn” through employing heuristics and proxies “that ultimate-
ly arrive at the same or similar results as would have been produced by a simi-
larly situated intelligent person employing higher order cognitive processes 
and training”). 
 6. Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously?: Free Speech Rights and 
Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169 (2016). 
 7. Id. at 1175–86. 
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In this Article, we build on this provocative claim. In so do-
ing, we consider important counter-arguments, and suggest 
ways in which the rise of AI may inspire critical engagement 
with free speech theory and doctrine. This Article starts by re-
prising our earlier observation that the United States Supreme 
Court now emphasizes listeners’ interests in free speech out-
puts—rather than speakers’ humanness or humanity—in ways 
that make it exceedingly difficult to place AI speakers beyond 
the First Amendment’s reach. We then explain that First 
Amendment coverage of strong AI speakers would be consistent 
with the current Court’s largely “negative” view of the First 
Amendment that focuses on the First Amendment as a means 
of constraining the government, rather than on protecting 
speech as a positive good.8 Next, we explore a range of theoreti-
cal, doctrinal, and practical objections to the claim that the 
First Amendment may cover strong AI speech. Although we 
take these concerns seriously, we conclude that none of them 
eliminates the possibility of First Amendment coverage for AI 
speech. Finally, we suggest that current free speech law con-
tains means by which courts could view some regulation of cer-
tain AI speech outputs as consistent with the First Amend-
ment.9 
Thinking about the potential emergence of strong AI 
speakers forces us to face complicated questions about the role 
of harm in First Amendment case law. This in turn drives, or 
really revives, discussions about whether and when speech 
causes harm—and whether and when the First Amendment 
 
 8. Id. at 1182 n.50. 
 9. As Frederick Schauer has observed, “The question of which forms of 
speech are covered by the First Amendment is . . . distinct from the question of 
how much protection the speech that is covered will receive.” Frederick 
Schauer, Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 
346, 348 (2015). Some types of communication—such as a great deal of speech 
addressed by the law of contract, evidence, and antitrust—are “understood as 
having nothing to do with the First Amendment.” Id. at 347. Such expression 
receives no First Amendment coverage, and thus can be regulated by the gov-
ernment without any free speech analysis at all. Once speech is covered by the 
First Amendment—that is, visible to First Amendment analysis at all—
whether it is protected by the First Amendment from government regulation 
depends on the results of applying the appropriate level of scrutiny. As we ex-
plain below, even if AI speech is covered by the First Amendment and thus 
triggers First Amendment scrutiny, whether it is protected from government 
regulation is a separate question that turns on the application of the relevant 
level of review. 
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permits the regulation of speech to address some kinds of 
harms, versus others.10 
This thought experiment highlights the centrality of the 
listener in ongoing as well as emerging free speech debates. If 
we justify expanding speech coverage on the grounds that the 
speech is good for listeners,11 then we should also take seriously 
listeners’ interests in protection from harms caused by that 
speech. This has implications for many current free speech 
problems, including the governance of information intermediar-
ies and network neutrality;12 of commercial speech;13 of speech 
in the context of employment relationships;14 and even of sur-
veillance.15 
 
 10. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12–
2, at 580 n.9 (1st ed. 1978) (suggesting that government regulation of speech is 
suspect when the government “aim[s] at ideas or information,” but that such 
regulation may be less suspect when the government aims at speech’s 
“noncommunicative impact”); Rebecca L. Brown, The Harm Principle and Free 
Speech, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 954 (2016) (explaining that the “harm principle 
allows government to limit liberties as necessary to prevent harm” and that 
“we should be slow to assume that society is necessarily without power to pro-
tect itself from harm that expression may cause”). 
 11. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 12. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1445, 1458 (2013) (describing how the Supreme Court’s current First 
Amendment doctrine may apply to the substantive results produced by algo-
rithms); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 910 
(2014) (detailing how multiple perspectives view the results of web-based, au-
tomatic algorithms differently under First Amendment doctrine); Tim Wu, 
Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1513 (2013) (contending that more 
rigor and predictability ought to be injected into the method for courts’ appli-
cations of First Amendment doctrine to technologically originated speech). 
 13. See, e.g., TAMARA PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12 
(2012) (evaluating and critiquing the judicial expansion of First Amendment 
doctrine to protect commercial entities). 
 14. See generally Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employ-
er Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016) (critically 
reviewing recent trends in the ways that First Amendment protections expand 
in the employment context). 
 15. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Exper-
iments in Living: Libraries, the Right To Read, and a First Amendment Theory 
for an Unaccompanied Right To Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799, 
881 (2006) (defending libraries as places where information seekers have a 
First Amendment right to receive information); Julie E. Cohen, A Right To 
Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 
28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 983–84 (1996) (explaining how “copyright management” 
has developed to monitor and meter the use of intellectual property); Neil M. 
Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 388 (2008) (arguing that 
freedom from intellectual surveillance or interference is a cornerstone of First 
Amendment liberty because it allows citizens to freely make up their mind 
and develop new ideas). 
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Some will point out that the possibility of strong AI as yet 
remains—and may always remain—entirely hypothetical. We 
recognize that the feasibility of strong AI remains deeply con-
tested,16 and do not seek to resolve the debate among futurists 
about strong AI’s likelihood. Instead, we use the possibility of 
strong AI speech to illuminate how the logic of free speech law 
and doctrine can carry us to unfamiliar and uncomfortable, or 
even dangerous, places.17 Computers’ growing expressive capac-
ities cast meaningful light on puzzling and troublesome aspects 
of existing free speech law that may otherwise escape atten-
tion.18 
Current free speech theory and doctrine support the exten-
sion of free speech rights to strong AI speakers (if such speak-
ers ever come to exist), but such rights raise normative and 
practical difficulties. These may force reexamination of the con-
temporary turns in free speech law and theory that have made 
coverage of strong AI speakers plausible. Nothing prevents the 
Court from adjusting its current path, and we point out places 
 
 16. For an example of the view that the gap between capacities of human 
and computer speakers may be closing, see generally PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE 
MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE 
WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD (2015) (discussing machine learning—predictive 
analytics—and arguing that there may one day be a master algorithm that 
synthesizes the five primary schools of thought about machine learning and 
enables AI to teach itself from experience). Some futurists even predict that by 
century’s end, there will be “no distinction . . . between human and machine or 
between physical and virtual reality.” RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS 
NEAR 9 (2005). The only unequivocally human quality will be that the human 
species “inherently seeks to extend its physical and mental reach beyond cur-
rent limitations.” Id.; see also YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTO-
RY OF HUMANKIND 407 (2015) (discussing how cyborg engineering may trans-
form humankind such that humans would become “so fundamentally another 
kind of being that we cannot even grasp the philosophical, psychological or po-
litical implications”). For an example of a skeptical view, see Ryan Calo, Ro-
botics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 528 (2015) (“Little 
in the literature gives me confidence that artificial intelligence will approxi-
mate human intelligence in the foreseeable future. There are analytic and 
technical reasons to believe robots will never think like people.”). 
 17. But see Lawrence Lessig, Commentaries, The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) (“I am not defend-
ing the law of the horse. My claim is specific to cyberspace. We see something 
when we think about the regulation of cyberspace that other areas would not 
show us.”). 
 18. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Demo-
cratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (wrestling with the implications of digital speech 
for his notion of democratic culture). 
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where it may well do so.19 In the meantime, we start from a 
baseline that assumes the future Court will take current theo-
retical and doctrinal premises seriously, and we suggest possi-
ble paths forward. 
I.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FREE SPEECH RIGHTS FOR AI 
SPEAKERS   
Chatbots like MS Tay are computer programs written by 
people. To be sure, the outputs of such algorithms may be in-
creasingly less predictable and controllable by their creators.20 
Such algorithms are not, however, independent thinkers or be-
ings. Contemporary discussions of whether algorithmic outputs 
should be protected under the First Amendment have largely 
focused on whether the output is functional or editorial in na-
ture.21 These discussions reserve, or do not address, the ques-
tion of what to do about strong AI—as-yet-hypothetical ma-
chines that would actually think and generate expressive 
content independent of human direction—in contrast to current 
“weak AI” machines that only act as if they were intelligent. 
As this Part explains, theoretical justifications for protect-
ing speech under the First Amendment support protecting 
speech by strong AI both to provide value to human listeners 
and to restrain governmental excesses. The logic of the Court’s 
current free speech doctrine also supports its extension to pro-
tecting strong AI.22 Whether this makes normative sense is de-
batable. We aim to illuminate the normative tension, rather 
than resolve it. 
We begin by revisiting the positive theoretical justifications 
for protecting strong AI speech first discussed in “Siri-ously?: 
Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence” (Siri-ously 1.0).23 
We then build on that work to explore an additional thread of 
 
 19. This is far from the only area in which technological change may and 
perhaps should motivate doctrinal change. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Data-
Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 9) (on file with the authors) (“Workforce analytics pose an en-
tirely new set of challenges to [workplace] equality that calls for fundamental-
ly rethinking antidiscrimination doctrine.”). 
 20. Calo, supra note 16, at 538 (providing examples explaining how tech-
nology may change in years to come, including how technology may go awry). 
 21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 22. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1182–86 (examining the historical 
development of First Amendment doctrine, as well as how the First Amend-
ment has grown to cover newly emerging technology). 
 23. Id. 
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First Amendment theory: the “negative” view that distrusts the 
government’s exercise of its power to regulate speech, which 
lends further support for First Amendment coverage of AI 
speech. 
A. THE “POSITIVE” VIEW: PROTECTING SPEECH TO PROVIDE 
VALUE TO LISTENERS 
Conferring strong AI speakers with First Amendment 
rights is consistent with free speech theories that focus, among 
other things, on expression’s usefulness to human listeners.24 
The elasticity of such theories makes it difficult to exclude non-
human speakers entirely from their fold.25 Courts and commen-
tators have yet to settle on a single theory that informs the 
First Amendment.26 The most influential theories have either 
focused on positive arguments that discuss the primary values 
that speech promotes—democratic self-governance;27 enlight-
enment and the distribution of knowledge and ideas;28 and in-
dividual autonomy29—or on negative arguments that focus on 
 
 24. Id. at 1183–84. In this project, we discuss U.S. freedom of expression 
law. In international law, readers’ rights are more explicit. See, e.g., Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“Everyone 
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds . . . .”); Molly K. 
Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 393, 
431 (2013) (“Article 19(2) explicitly calls for protection of the rights of individ-
uals to receive information and expression from others, thus guarding not only 
the quintessential expressive activity of speaking but also the information-
gathering activities that precede speech.”). 
 25. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1175–76 (describing both how and 
why First Amendment doctrine’s current breadth requires expanding the pro-
tections to technologically based speech). 
 26. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH IN AMERICA 3 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (“The Court has not fashioned 
a single, general theory which would explain all of its decisions; rather, it has 
floated different principles for different problems.”). 
 27. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELA-
TION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing that freedom of speech derives 
from the necessities of self-governance rather than a natural right). 
 28. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground 
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”). 
 29. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
(1989) (emphasizing individualistic concerns and speaker liberty); RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 201–05 (1977) (focusing on speaker dig-
nity and respect). Seana Valentine Shiffrin’s work on a thinker-based First 
Amendment is among those that fall under the autonomy theory umbrella. See 
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the dangers of government action in this area.30 We explain 
why none of these theories eliminates the possibility that the 
First Amendment covers AI speech.31 
Democracy-based theories emphasize the value of speech to 
democratic self-governance, which usually entails focusing on 
public discourse rather than individual speakers.32 Alexander 
Meiklejohn, often cited for developing this self-governance the-
ory, observed that what matters for freedom of speech is not 
that all people speak, but that “everything worth saying shall 
be said.”33 Speaker identity plays little or no role in 
Meiklejohn’s inquiry. Strong AI speech that contributes to the 
democratic process—i.e., that is “worth saying”—therefore may 
be covered. 
Robert Post has set forth a theory of freedom of expression 
similarly based on principles of self-government. Post argues 
that the First Amendment is “designed to protect the processes 
of democratic legitimation” and fosters confidence that citizens 
participate in a legitimate process in which their representa-
tives speak for them.34 Admittedly, this version of democratic 
self-governance does focus on the dignity of human speakers. 
However, if and when they produce information useful to natu-
ral persons who seek to participate in public discourse, strong 
AI speakers should warrant similar protection. Likewise, if 
squelching AI speech draws into question the legitimacy of 
democratic process, then free speech values would be implicat-
 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 284 (2011). 
 30. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination 
of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (discussing 
a negative view of the First Amendment that “does not rest on the affirmative 
claim that free speech will lead to any particular social or political benefits” 
and instead emphasizes the dangers created “when collective entities are in-
volved in the determination of truth”). 
 31. For additional detail, see Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1175–82. 
 32. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960) (asserting that what matters for 
freedom of speech is not that all speak, but that “everything worth saying 
shall be said”). To be sure, under this view, limits can and should be imposed 
where the speech does not serve this audience-sensitive value. 
 33. Id. 
 34. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 8 (2014) (explaining that there must be “a chain of com-
munication . . . ‘sufficiently strong and discernible’ to sustain the popular con-
viction that representatives spoke for the people whom they purported to rep-
resent” (quoting JAMES WILSON & THOMAS MCKEAN, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 30–31 (1792)). 
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ed.35 That an AI rather than a human produces that infor-
mation should not matter in Post’s approach. 
Jack Balkin goes beyond representative democracy justifi-
cations to offer a theory of free speech that uses the word “dem-
ocratic” to mean “cultural participation—the freedom and the 
ability of individuals to participate in culture, and especially a 
digital culture.”36 Balkin’s account gives explicit attention to 
speaker humanness, noting that “[h]uman beings are made out 
of culture. A democratic culture is valuable because it gives or-
dinary people a fair opportunity to participate in the creation 
and evolution of the processes of meaning-making that shape 
them and become part of them.”37 Balkin’s focus, though, is not 
just on the humanness of the speaker; human listeners who re-
ceive the speech also matter.38 
AI speech quite clearly can contribute to a human audi-
ence’s meaning-making, and to human construction of selfhood 
in a cultural universe. Even AI speech aimed at another AI 
might, albeit indirectly, contribute to this meaning-making. 
Thus, Siri-ously 1.0 posited, “Balkin’s democratic culture per-
spective . . . would not rule out cases in which strong AI speak-
ers contribute to the democratic disco.”39 On the contrary, 
Balkin’s perspective could afford more protection than other 
democratic discourse models. Where Meiklejohn’s model might 
protect speech about elections, and Post’s model might protect 
 
 35. We are not attributing this view to Post; we argue instead that it flows 
from his theory of democratic participation as the rationale for protecting 
speech. See id. 
 36. Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 
NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1059–61 (2016); see also Jack M. Balkin, Information Fi-
duciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1205 (2016) 
[hereinafter Balkin, Information Fiduciaries] (arguing in favor of expanded, 
quasi-fiduciary responsibilities for parties who manage and disseminate digi-
tal information); Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2014) (comparing historic trends of First Amendment 
doctrine with more modern concerns, ultimately arguing for increased scrutiny 
of digitally based private speech because of its societal importance); Jack M. 
Balkin, The First Amendment Is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 
(2012) (distinguishing between democratic information states and authoritari-
an information states, discussing challenges posed by technology for the for-
mer, and arguing that thinking about knowledge and information policy and 
infrastructure matters as much to democratic information states as thinking 
about freedom of speech as an individual right). 
 37. Balkin, supra note 18, at 33. 
 38. Id. at 39 (“[P]rocesses of meaning-making include both the ability to 
distribute those meanings and the ability to receive them.” (emphasis added)). 
 39. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1178. 
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AI contributions to the public sphere, Balkin’s model also would 
protect AI musicians40 and artists41 as contributors to the cul-
ture by which human listeners and readers define themselves. 
The classic marketplace-of-ideas approach to free speech 
questions emphasizes expression’s instrumental value to lis-
teners’ knowledge and enlightenment.42 The production of ideas 
and information is what matters, regardless of source. This 
theory presupposes that more speech best facilitates listeners’ 
acquisition of knowledge and discovery of truth (whatever that 
means).43 This “more speech beats less” justification casts an 
even wider First Amendment coverage net than self-
governance theories. Under an enlightenment theory, speech 
that does not promote democratic participation still has much 
First Amendment value. And information that flows from non-
human sources may have considerable value to human listen-
ers. As long as the information contributes to the marketplace-
of-ideas, its nonhuman source should not matter. 
Finally, autonomy-based free speech theories—which em-
phasize the value of expression in furthering individual auton-
omy—simultaneously point in opposite directions as applied to 
AI speech.44 On the one hand, if what matters is a speaker’s au-
tonomy in expressing her own thoughts and beliefs, then AI 
may not qualify for First Amendment coverage because even 
strong AI speakers are arguably not autonomous beings.45 As 
Lawrence Solum has thoughtfully discussed, even strong AI 
might be thought to be “missing something”—souls, conscious-
ness, intentionality, feelings, interests, and free will—in ways 
 
 40. Russell Brandom, Google’s Art Machine Just Wrote Its First Song, THE 
VERGE (June 1, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/2016/6/1/11829678/google 
-magenta-melody-art-generative-artificial-intelligence. 
 41. Joseph Stromberg, These Abstract Portraits Were Painted by an Artifi-
cial Intelligence Program, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www 
.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/these-abstract-portraits-were-painted-by 
-an-artificial-intelligence-program-180947590/?no-ist. 
 42. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 
15–34 (1982); Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1, 33–44.  
 43. See Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger 
Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) (describing the values most often lo-
cated at the heart of the First Amendment as including the search for truth 
and the discovery and dissemination of knowledge); Frederick Schauer, The 
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitu-
tional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1786 (2004) (same). 
 44. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1178–82. 
 45. Id. at 1178. 
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that could be relevant to speaker-based autonomy theories.46 
We address these concerns in more detail in Part II. 
On the other hand, autonomy-based theories counsel pro-
tection not just of autonomous human speakers, but also of au-
tonomous human listeners who consume information and rely 
on others’ speech when developing their own thoughts and be-
liefs.47 To the extent that autonomy-based theories emphasize 
the autonomy of human listeners and readers, they support 
coverage of strong AI speech. Machines can and do produce in-
formation relevant to human listeners’ autonomous decision-
making and freedom of thought. As such, even the intuitively 
appealing argument that AI is still “missing something” does 
not eliminate the possibility of First Amendment coverage for 
AI speech. 
B. THE “NEGATIVE” VIEW: CURBING GOVERNMENTAL POWER 
The above theories all take a “positive” view of the First 
Amendment, which affirmatively urges that free expression 
provides value to individuals and communities that warrants 
constitutional protection.48 “Negative” First Amendment argu-
ments focus instead on the need to constrain the government’s 
potentially dangerous exercise of control over expression,49 and 
are rooted in distrust of the government as regulator rather 
than on theories that celebrate speakers.50 The Court’s increas-
ingly negative view of the First Amendment51 thus bolsters the 
above arguments for protection of AI speech. 
 
 46. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 
N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1262–76 (1992); see also Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, 
at 1179. 
 47. See Shiffrin, supra note 29 (describing a thinker-based approach to 
freedom of speech); see also Blitz, supra note 15 (promoting First Amendment 
protection of the right to receive information and ideas). 
 48. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 49. See Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 
WASH. L. REV. 445, 451 (2012) (describing a negative justification for the First 
Amendment as rooted “primarily on the grounds of distrust of government”); 
Nat Stern, Implications of Libel Doctrine for Nondefamatory Falsehoods Under 
the First Amendment, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 465, 503 (2012) (“To shelter 
ideas while leaving factual expression to plenary government control ignores 
an abiding First Amendment theme: wariness of government’s capacity and 
motives when acting as arbiter of truth.”). 
 50. See Gey, supra note 30, at 17 (emphasizing the dangers created “when 
collective entities are involved in the determination of truth”). 
 51. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2574 (2012) (discussing 
the need for a limiting principle on the government’s restriction of speech); 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470–72 (2010) (explaining that the 
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The Court currently treats the government’s content-based 
regulation of speech as presumptively impermissible, absent a 
showing that the speech falls into a traditionally and historical-
ly exempted category of protected speech.52 Even very troubling 
speech—animal crush videos, violent video games, and self-
aggrandizing lies—ordinarily cannot be regulated in a content-
specific manner without surviving the rigors of strict scrutiny.53 
The Court has justified this increasingly broad view of protec-
tion with skeptical references to the government’s institutional 
competence and the government’s limited ability to balance so-
cial costs and benefits when speech rights are at risk. Indeed, 
the Court’s recent wariness towards speech regulations dis-
plays a negative view of the First Amendment at least as much 
as support for any of the positive theories discussed above. For 
example, in United States v. Stevens54 the Court struck down on 
overbreadth grounds a federal law that criminalized the com-
mercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cru-
elty.55 In so doing, it rejected as “startling and dangerous” what 
it characterized as the government’s proposed “free-floating 
test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc 
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”56 
The negative view rests not only on concerns about short-
comings in the government’s institutional competence (i.e., the 
government’s clumsiness) but also on concerns about the gov-
ernment’s censorial motives (i.e., its malevolence, its self-
interest, or at the very least its paternalism). For example, the 
Court recently found in Heffernan v. City of Paterson that the 
government’s improper speech-suppressing motive alone suf-
 
government cannot restrict speech solely because the benefits outweigh the 
costs); see also Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 
161, 163–92 (considering questions raised by the Alvarez holding, which pro-
tected false statements under the First Amendment). 
 52. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1186. 
 53. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (striking down a regulation that made 
false claims of receiving certain military honors illegal); Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (striking down a regulation that pre-
vented minors’ access to violent interactive video games without parental con-
sent); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482 (striking down a regulation aimed at crush vid-
eos on overbreadth grounds); cf. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 
2231–32 (2015) (rejecting a more nuanced, contextualized approach to a town’s 
content-specific regulations of signs and instead applying strict scrutiny). 
 54. 559 U.S. 460.  
 55. Id. at 482. 
 56. Id. at 470; see also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. 
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ficed to establish a First Amendment violation.57 In Heffernan, 
police department officials demoted an officer because they 
mistakenly believed him to support an opposition mayoral can-
didate.58 The government was not insulated from liability based 
on its censorious motive because the employee did not actually 
support the candidate and had not actually engaged in political 
speech promoting the candidate.59 More simply: the Court still 
sanctioned the government’s mistaken demotion of him because 
of its speech-suppressing motive even though the employee had 
not engaged in protected speech.60 
The text of the First Amendment, the Court noted in Hef-
fernan, states that government “shall make no law . . . abridg-
ing the freedom of speech.”61 In so holding, the Court directly 
embraced the negative view of the First Amendment by empha-
sizing its restraints on potentially dangerous governmental 
power rather than positive reasons for protecting speakers or 
speech. The Court thus found a First Amendment violation 
simply because of the government’s impermissible motive, even 
in the absence of a human speaker engaged in protected 
speech. 
In none of these cases, of course, did the Court address the 
question of whether non-human speakers, or more specifically 
AI speakers, have First Amendment rights. But the Court’s 
concern about the government as a bad actor deserving of con-
straint rather than about human speakers as deserving of pro-
tection bears directly on our question of whether the govern-
ment’s suppression of AI speech will be found to violate the 
First Amendment. As Kathleen Sullivan has explained, this 
negative view understands the Free Speech Clause as “indiffer-
ent to a speaker’s identity or qualities—whether animate or in-
animate, corporate or nonprofit, collective or individual. To the 
extent the clause suggests who or what it protects, it suggests 
that it protects a system or process of ‘free speech,’ not the 
rights of any determinate set of speakers.”62 
 
 57. 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (“When an employer demotes an employ-
ee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in political activity 
the First Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to challenge that un-
lawful action under the First Amendment.”). 
 58. Id. at 1416. 
 59. Id. at 1418. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 143, 156 (2010). 
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A focus on the constitutional text as constraining the gov-
ernment actor—“Congress shall make no law”—adds to the 
plausibility of future First Amendment coverage of AI speech.63 
Courts that focus on curbing the government might well strike 
down suspect regulations because of improper government mo-
tives regardless of the speaker’s humanness. Protecting strong 
AI speech from government regulation is thus consistent with 
negative theory’s “deep skepticism about the good faith of those 
controlling the government.”64 This theory may even support 
coverage of future AI-to-AI speech, no less than AI-to-human 
speech, if government restriction of that speech were motivated 
by an impermissible desire to suppress the content or viewpoint 
of the speech. The negative view of the First Amendment is 
both exceptionally speech-friendly and speaker-agnostic. 
The appeal of the negative view of the First Amendment 
may include its ability to dodge tricky definitional questions 
about when a speaker’s own actions should count as “speech,” 
by focusing instead on any nefarious government motive in 
suppressing the actions.65 But in so doing, negative theory then 
creates a new line-drawing problem of its own. Negative theory 
offers no meaningful limiting principles that would permit gov-
ernment to regulate speech under certain conditions. It also 
does not elide the “what is speech” question entirely, as no free 
speech problem arises if a government motive is to regulate 
pure conduct and the law is applied in a speech-neutral way. 
Thus the definitional question does not disappear, but instead 
shifts from asking whether a particular activity is speech to 
asking whether the government intends to target speech. In 
any event, here we note the Court’s increasing reliance on neg-
ative theory to justify its free speech decisions, and that such 
reliance, if taken seriously, adds support to the possibility of 
First Amendment coverage of AI speech. 
In sum, both positive and negative theories support the 
idea of extending First Amendment coverage to strong AI. To 
make these claims less abstract, take the following hypothet-
 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 64. See Gey, supra note 30, at 21; see also Elena Kagan, Private Speech, 
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doc-
trine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (emphasizing improper government 
motive as the central offense to First Amendment values). 
 65. See, e.g., Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (2016) (“[T]he government faces a heightened burden when it sin-
gles out speech.”). 
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ical. A strong AI version of the Tolstoy-bot writes long, intri-
cate, socially astute novels about the 2016 election cycle, in-
spired by the work of Leo Tolstoy.66 The works cannot be traced 
in any way to a human author or programmer. In our hypothet-
ical, they are the creative work solely of our Tolstoy-bot AI. 
To a traditional democratic self-governance theorist, such 
novels would be covered by the First Amendment to the extent 
that they contribute to public discourse and political debate.67 
To Post, they would be covered both because they are public 
discourse, and because government restrictions on their publi-
cation would call into question for individual human citizens 
the legitimacy of that governance regime.68 To Balkin, they 
would be protected because readers of the novels could use the 
books to dynamically construct a culturally situated self.69 To 
marketplace-of-ideas theorists, the novels would be protected to 
the extent they contribute to their readers’ search for “truth,” 
knowledge, or enlightenment.70 To autonomy theorists, the nov-
els would be protected because interference in their publication 
would squelch readers’ autonomy, impinging on freedom of in-
formation-gathering, self-construction, and thought.71 And to 
those taking the negative view of the First Amendment, the 
novels would be protected from laws that arise from an illegit-
imate government motive, perhaps resulting from a desire to 
squelch social criticism (or a deep hatred of long-form litera-
ture).72 
Only a theory that insists that speech has value solely in-
sofar as it enhances human speakers’ and not listeners’ auton-
 
 66. Joshua Barrie, Computers Are Writing Novels: Read a Few Samples 
Here, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/novels 
-written-by-computers-2014-11 (describing a 2008 “320-page novel [that] is a 
variation of Leo Tolstoy’s ‘Anna Karenina,’ but worded in the style of a Japa-
nese author called Haruki Murakami”). 
 67. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (describing self-
governance theories). 
 68. Our claim, not his. For a discussion of Post’s theory of freedom of ex-
pression, see supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 69. Our claim, not his. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describ-
ing Balkin’s theory of free speech). 
 70. To review the marketplace-of-ideas theory, see supra notes 42–43 and 
accompanying text. 
 71. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (explaining autonomy 
theory). 
 72. See supra Part I.B (overviewing negative views of the First Amend-
ment). 
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omy cuts against this grain.73 The next Part therefore explores 
the role—if any—of speakers’ autonomy, dignity, and emotion 
in current First Amendment law. 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT LAW AND ITS INATTENTION TO 
SPEAKER HUMANNESS   
First Amendment doctrine already protects speakers that 
are not conventionally human.74 Corporations receive speech 
protection as legal persons,75 and courts already have protected 
algorithmic speech (as the product of human programmers, but 
still).76 Nevertheless, the biggest hurdle to protecting the 
speech rights of strong AI is the assertion that humanness 
matters, or should matter, to First Amendment rights. 
Humans are the quintessential language animal.77 We con-
stantly construct ourselves out of layers of meaning, both pro-
duced and consumed.78 In all of these respects, language makes 
us distinctive—it gives us a capacity to adapt, a fluidity “which 
has no parallel among other animals.”79 Humans are the only 
language animal, so realized. Human law, including constitu-
tional law, was designed for this animal, and maps imperfectly 
onto other animals, let alone onto inanimate machines. 
If language is so essential to our existence as human be-
ings, how can it be that legal protection for the use of language 
does not turn on a speaker’s humanness? This Part addresses 
why speaker humanness may not matter for purposes of our 
 
 73. See C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 
84 IND. L.J. 981, 997 (2009) (arguing that free speech protections should not 
apply to commercial speech because it “is not an exercise of freedom by moral-
ly significant flesh-and-blood individuals”). 
 74. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1183–85. 
 75. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010). 
 76. Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(characterizing search engine algorithmically produced results as “in essence 
editorial judgments about which political ideas to promote”); see also Langdon 
v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google 
Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 
2003). 
 77. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, THE LANGUAGE ANIMAL: THE FULL 
SHAPE OF THE HUMAN LINGUISTIC CAPACITY (2016) (describing how language 
shapes the human experience). 
 78. Id. at 30–38. We also locate emotional meanings in the body—words 
have meaning in part because they express a feeling that registers in our 
physical beings. Id. at 247. 
 79. Id. at 339. 
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contemporary First Amendment rights regime, even if one fo-
cuses on the expressive uniqueness of human beings.80 
A. WHAT ABOUT AUTONOMY AND DIGNITY? 
The intuition that a speaker must be human to trigger 
First Amendment coverage remains deeply felt for many rea-
sons. If we protect speech to protect a speaker’s autonomy and 
dignity, then it seems unimaginable to protect an AI that argu-
ably has neither dignity nor autonomy interests. Even corpora-
tions, which fit less easily into constitutional garb, have hu-
mans within them. 
Free speech theories that value speech for its role in fur-
thering the autonomy of the speaker thus present significant 
barriers to coverage for strong AI speakers.81 However, speaker 
autonomy arguments face several difficulties. First, speaker 
autonomy arguments must identify intrinsic qualities of moral 
personhood that are unique to humans. As AI advances, the 
gap between machines and humans may narrow in ways that 
weaken this uniqueness claim. Second, and more fundamental-
ly, insisting that humans alone possess intrinsic qualities of 
moral personhood does not prove that those qualities should 
matter for purposes of conferring free speech rights.82 
As discussed in Siri-ously 1.0, the personhood barrier for 
First Amendment protections could be overcome if (1) we 
change how we view protected “persons” for practical or theo-
retical reasons; or (2) AI came to function in ways that satisfied 
our personhood criteria.83 We are seeing changes on both fronts. 
Free speech theory has marched steadily away from a construc-
tion of legal personhood that views speakers solely through an 
individual or animate lens, and now defines them in a practi-
cal, non-ontological sense.84 Under this view, and as discussed 
 
 80. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1178–82. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Jason Iuliano, Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, 90 IND. 
L.J. 47, 71 (2015) (“Two competing theories of personhood have dominated the 
philosophical literature. The first account maintains that persons are distin-
guished by certain intrinsic characteristics, that there is some innate sub-
stance that captures personhood . . . . The second holds that persons are dis-
tinguished by certain external characteristics. According to this account, any 
agent that performs in a certain manner qualifies as a person.”). 
 83. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1179–82. 
 84. See supra Part I; see also EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE 
38 (2011) (“The defining hallmark of liberalism is that the ultimate unit of 
moral value is the individual. For law, however, the unit to which rights and 
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above, speech should be protected because it serves democratic 
self-governance, or leads to better thinking, or even better 
markets—not necessarily because the source of speech is a hu-
man speaker whose rights arise from innately human dignity.85 
Technological advances also may enable some AI to satisfy cer-
tain criteria for legal personhood.86 AI enhancements can blur 
the line between AI rights and legal personhood by making the 
relevant differences between computer programs and human 
“programs” less stark and less significant. Speaker personhood 
thus is not necessarily a First Amendment trump card, even 
under autonomy theories.87 
 
duties attach is the legal person. The two are not the same. An individual has 
legal personality, but so do a wide variety of groups, such as unions, corpora-
tions, communities, Indigenous people, and municipalities. The rule of law ap-
plies to legal persons, and not just to individuals.” (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted)). 
 85. See supra Part I. We note too that originalist arguments likely counsel 
against giving free speech protection to machines; James Madison no doubt 
envisioned that human speakers, not machines, would be covered by the First 
Amendment. Those who ratified the amendment presumably did, too. Hu-
manness, according to this originalist argument, is a necessary predicate for 
First Amendment coverage. We offer two responses. First, the text of the free 
speech clause makes no mention of a human speaker and instead restricts on-
ly “Congress,” suggesting the possibility that the original readers of the clause 
understood it simply to constrain government rather than to protect speakers. 
Second, the current Court boasts no more than two committed originalists 
(Justice Thomas and perhaps the newly confirmed Justice Gorsuch), and strict 
originalist arguments are unlikely to control its First Amendment doctrine. 
 86. Again, computers are increasingly self-directed or “autonomous.” See 
infra note 122. Some forms of AI already are being designed in ways that may 
afford them enhanced emotional intelligence and other features that narrow 
the gap between humans and computers. See generally BLUEPRINT FOR AF-
FECTIVE COMPUTING: A SOURCEBOOK (Klaus R. Scherer et al. eds., 2010) (dis-
cussing affective computing, which is focused on theory and design of comput-
ers that can detect, respond to, and simulate human emotional states); 
RAFAEL A. CALVO & DORIAN PETERS, POSITIVE COMPUTING: TECHNOLOGY FOR 
WELLBEING AND HUMAN POTENTIAL (2014) (discussing how AI is being devel-
oped to detect nonverbal cues and otherwise be deployed to grasp and improve 
human self-awareness and emotional well-being); ROSALIND W. PICARD, AF-
FECTIVE COMPUTING (1997); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE COMPU-
TING (Rafael A. Calvo et al. eds., 2015) (providing a reference for research in 
the emerging field of affective computing, which addresses how affective fac-
tors influence interactions between humans and computers and how the latter 
may be designed with social skills). These capacities are of particular rele-
vance to us here. 
 87. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1181–82. The First Amend-
ment is not the only area in which AI developments are pushing us to rethink 
settled legal expectations about human actors. Copyright protections, which 
would seem intuitively to vest in a human author, have long been justified in 
the United States predominantly by a utilitarian consideration of incentives 
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If anything, thinking about strong AI speech rights illus-
trates just how much human dignity and speaker autonomy 
have been downplayed or erased from the First Amendment 
equation. It forces us to attend to the ways in which law has 
ignored the “missing something” problem that drives autono-
my-based objections to AI rights. 
We elaborate on the potential irrelevance of speaker per-
sonhood by turning to two specific objections some might have 
to AI speech rights that relate to speaker humanness. First we 
discuss whether a speaker must possess human emotions to 
merit First Amendment coverage. Then we examine whether 
free speech rights for AI would lead inexorably to coverage of 
animals or other nonhuman speakers. 
B. WHAT ABOUT EMOTIONS? 
Emotion matters to human thought88 as well as to legal 
rights and responsibilities. For example, shame is an important 
piece of emotional hardware that assists humans in thinking 
about the consequences of acts to which shame is linked.89 Re-
 
for the production of creative goods. The utilitarian justification for copyright 
protection, combined with doctrinal development that lowers the originality 
threshold, may also have made room for non-human authors in that area of 
law (as much as the Copyright Office denies this possibility). Annemarie 
Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 
2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 3–9; James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate 
Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657, 680 (2016) (“Robots that act indistinguishably 
from humans can also be expected to respond indistinguishably from them in 
response to legal pressures.”). But see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM 
OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 306 (3d ed. 2014), http://www 
.copyright.gov/comp3 (“The U.S. Copyright Office will register an original work 
of authorship, provided that the work was created by a human being.”); Pame-
la Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 
U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1200 (1986) (arguing that computers need no in-
centives to generate output and thus cannot be classified as authors). Again, 
the entrance of AI into the legal system, like the entrance of any other disrup-
tive technology, forces us to reconsider underlying theory and changes the 
conversation in ways that reveal an increasing utilitarian bent, where we look 
to costs and incentives or systemic governance justifications, such as restrict-
ing governmental overreach. 
 88. As emotion theorist Silvan Tomkins has put it, “Reason without affect 
would be impotent, affect without reason would be blind.” SILVAN S. TOMKINS, 
AFFECT, IMAGERY, CONSCIOUSNESS: VOL. I: THE POSITIVE AFFECTS 112 (1962). 
For a compelling account of the interaction of cognition and emotion see 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF 
EMOTIONS 454 (2001) (“Some emotions are at least potential allies of, and in-
deed constituents in, rational deliberation.”). 
 89. For a discussion of the psychological literature on shame and how it 
may bear on law, especially on government use of shaming penalties, see 
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morse is a factor in determining whether a person who has vio-
lated the law should be punished, and to what extent, and to 
whether the harms to the victim have been properly acknowl-
edged.90 As Martha Nussbaum has said, “[L]aw without appeals 
to emotion is virtually unthinkable . . . . [T]he law ubiquitously 
takes account of people’s emotional states.”91 Fear of repercus-
sions—loss of status, compromised interpersonal bonds, eco-
nomic losses, freedom, self-respect, even death—all factor into 
how law works to constrain human behavior. 
Computers, at present, lack these and other relevant emo-
tional capacities in ways that make them awkward legal rights 
bearers at best. AI speakers are incapable of assuming emo-
tional responsibility for the harms that they cause. Even the 
most emotionally unintelligent humans surpass AI in this re-
spect. 
Emerging developments in affective computing, though, 
may challenge the casual assumption that AI lacks feelings.92 
For one thing, human emotions are, according to some theo-
rists, themselves “adaptations, well-engineered software mod-
ules that work in harmony with the intellect and are indispen-
 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE 
LAW (2004) (discussing the links between disgust, shame, and law); Dan M. 
Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 
2086–91 (2006) (amending his earlier work and concluding government sham-
ing may have too many negative consequences to warrant its use); Toni M. 
Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 655–73 (1997) (discussing psychological literature on 
shame and its relevance to government shaming); David A. Skeel, Jr., Sham-
ing in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1823–36 (2001) (discussing 
how shaming works and the implications for shaming sanctions in corporate 
arenas); James Q. Whitman, What’s Wrong with Inflicting Shaming Sanc-
tions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060–68 (1998) (discussing risks of government 
shaming, especially that government thereby assigns punishment function to 
mob justice). 
 90. See AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 107–14 (2004) (discussing the role of 
remorse in accepting responsibility for misdeeds and making reparations). 
 91. NUSSBAUM, supra note 89, at 5. See generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW 
(Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (collecting essays on emotions and law). 
 92. “[A]ffective computing” describes the interdisciplinary process of de-
signing computer systems and devices that can recognize, interpret, simulate, 
and process human affects. That capacity is expanding. See DAVID ROSE, EN-
CHANTED OBJECTS: DESIGN, HUMAN DESIRE, AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
167 (2014) (explaining that computers “can sense sound, light, touch, many 
kinds of movement, biometric data such as heart rate and fingerprints, liquid 
flow, barometric pressure, radiation, temperature, proximity, and location” as 
emotional cues); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing af-
fective computing). 
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sable to the functioning of the whole mind.”93 That is, the more 
we learn about human brains and the interplay of emotion and 
reason, the more humans may look like extraordinarily com-
plex computers. Emotions also may be means to an end—
“mechanisms that set the brain’s highest-level goals.”94 If think-
ing and feeling go hand in hand in this way for humans, then a 
brilliant thinking machine also may be able to “feel” in ways 
akin to humans. 
More centrally, this thought experiment reveals that 
speaker human attributes—including speaker emotions—are 
not necessary to contemporary First Amendment law. Free 
speech law pays extraordinarily little attention to speakers’ 
emotional intelligence. The freedom of speech umbrella covers 
the least empathic speaker among us, no less than the exquis-
itely sensitive. Members of the Westboro Baptist Church are 
protected when they picket the funerals of soldiers and display 
signs proclaiming “God Hates Fags” and “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers.”95 First Amendment protections apply to racist, homo-
phobic, sexist, blasphemous, or otherwise cruel postings on Fa-
cebook pages or other social media sites, despite the grave emo-
tional harms they may inflict.96 
Courts likewise do not inquire into the emotional capacities 
of a corporation when it exercises its First Amendment free-
doms.97 And when the law focuses solely on bad government 
motives regarding speech suppression rather than on whether 
protected speech in fact occurred, the speaker’s actual autono-
my and human attributes drop out of the picture altogether. 
The primary focus is on the government and its antagonism 
towards speech, not on any actual human speaker herself or it-
self. 
 
 93. STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 370 (1997). 
 94. Id. at 373; see also George Johnson, Consciousness: The Mind Messing 
with the Mind, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), https://nyti.ms/29quHMK (referenc-
ing Princeton neuroscientist Michael Graziano as suggesting that “conscious-
ness is a kind of con game the brain plays with itself. The brain is a computer 
that evolved to simulate the outside world. Among its internal models is a 
simulation of itself—a crude approximation of its own neurological processes”). 
 95. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2010). 
 96. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) 
(discussing cyberharassment); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, 
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Infor-
mation Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1437–39 (2011) (discussing cyber harass-
ment’s move to popular social media sites). 
 97. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (making no in-
quiry into the emotional capacities of the Citizens United organization). 
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The darker aspect of a free speech theory that emphasizes 
boundless expressive autonomy—i.e., that it places a constitu-
tional right in the hands of some speakers who use the right 
recklessly, stupidly, immaturely, coarsely, even insanely—has 
not gone unnoticed.98 On the contrary, the unlikeable, irrespon-
sible speaker who hurts others feelings is historically central to 
American free speech law. Early cases such as Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, which defines the unprotected class of 
“fighting words,”99 developed out of a sense that in the speech 
realm at least, hurt feelings are subordinated to both cultural 
pluralism and individualism.100 We protect the speaker who 
feels no compunction about his wounding words because line-
drawing around emotional harms is seen as anti-pluralistic. 
Even if strong AI proves to be better than the worst of hu-
man speakers, and even if strong AI never matches the best of 
human speakers in terms of emotional intelligence and grace, 
AI’s free speech rights may not hinge on either capacity. What 
will matter—at least under current theory and doctrine—is 
whether AI says something listeners should hear, or something 
that government should not be allowed to silence. 
C. WHAT ABOUT OTHER NONHUMAN “SPEAKERS”? 
Extending free speech coverage to AI raises powerful slip-
pery slope concerns.101 Would the extension of First Amendment 
 
 98. As Zechariah Chafee once said, free speech not only protects the noble 
dissenter, but also “loud-mouthed unattractive men whose evidence and ideas 
are rather worthless.” ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 
113 (2d ed. 1956); see also Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of 
Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 63–64 (1987) (de-
scribing some plaintiffs in public employee free speech cases as “whistle blow-
ers, whiners, and weirdos” who not only violate workplace discourse norms in 
ways that prompt employer discipline, but then take the more aggressive steps 
of suing and claiming retaliation). 
 99. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 100. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornogra-
phy, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 299, 305 
(1988) (characterizing a First Amendment question as “a question that in-
volves the obligations of a legal order in a heterogeneous society comprised of 
diverse and competitive groups,” and identifying three kinds of law: “assimila-
tionist law strives toward social uniformity by imposing the values of a domi-
nant cultural group; pluralist law safeguards diversity by enabling competing 
groups to maintain their distinct perspectives; individualist law rejects group 
values altogether in favor of the autonomous choices of individuals”). 
 101. A related slippery slope concern asks what constitutional rights other 
than free speech might extend to AI. Again, we take care to focus only on the 
possibility of free speech rights for strong AIs, and not on any other set of con-
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coverage to AI similarly require coverage of other nonhuman 
speakers?102 At one discussion of AI speech rights, an audience 
member asked whether these arguments had a logical stopping 
point that would exclude her cat from free speech coverage.103 
Cats and other domestic animals communicate with their hu-
mans in multiple ways that may qualify as an intent to com-
municate reasonably understood as such, especially with re-
spect to needs that they want the humans to fulfill. Similar and 
perhaps stronger arguments attach to the communication of 
dolphins and nonhuman primates.104 
We offer several observations in response to these slippery 
slope concerns. First, the ease with which autonomous AI 
speakers fit into current free speech theory and doctrine says 
more about First Amendment theory and doctrine than it does 
about changes in technology, or our understanding of animals. 
Extending rights to AI thus might force courts and other 
decisionmakers to reexamine arguments that free speech and 
other constitutional rights should apply to other potential 
rights bearers, including animals.105 We look forward to that 
provocative conversation, should it occur.106 
 
stitutional rights. Indeed, not all rights are, or should be, necessarily available 
to all legal persons. For example, that a legal person has the right to sue and 
be sued—or to speak—does not necessarily mean that it has, or should have, 
the right to vote or a right to privacy. See Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Cor-
porate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 321 (2015) (“Of course corporations 
are not genuine human beings and should not automatically receive all the 
constitutional rights that human beings claim. At the same time . . . it is simi-
larly obvious that corporations should be able to claim some constitutional 
rights. So which ones, and when?”). 
 102. See generally FRANS DE WAAL, ARE WE SMART ENOUGH TO KNOW 
HOW SMART ANIMALS ARE? (2016) (discussing ways in which many animals 
have vast, still underappreciated, capacities that may bear on how law—
including free speech law—should treat them). We write this mindful of his 
arresting examples of sweet potato-washing Japanese macaques, bottlenose 
dolphins that buoyed a stunned fellow dolphin by carrying her on their bodies 
and submerging their own blowholes beneath the water surface until she re-
vived, and the surprising braininess of the octopus. Id. at 52, 133, 246–49. 
 103. Thanks to Sue Glueck for raising this question. 
 104. Ryan Calo asked whether arguments that the First Amendment co-
vers AI speech also suggest First Amendment coverage for random acts of na-
ture, like rogue waves that refigure sand on the beach to shape words that 
government might want to erase. Calo posed the free speech hypothetical in 
which waves on a beach (weirdly) formed symbols or words that humans in-
terpreted as deeply offensive or frightening (or perhaps inspiring), and won-
dered whether a local government’s erasure of such markings to prevent po-
tential negative impacts would present a First Amendment problem. 
 105. See Tilikum v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 
1262 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that the Thirteenth Amendment applies 
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Second, a decision to extend First Amendment coverage to 
AI speech does not inexorably lead to coverage of other nonhu-
man speakers. Animal communication skills are not evolving 
nearly as rapidly as AI skills.107 Nor is the evolutionary arc of 
animal language as amenable to human direction or crafting in 
the very direct ways that the arc of AI language is. AI is hu-
man-designed and profoundly and exclusively human-centered 
in terms of the needs it seeks to address. AI expression argua-
bly will benefit human audiences more pointedly, pervasively, 
and profoundly than a cat’s meows. Moreover, AI communica-
tion is deliberately supplanting human communication at 
nodes (think finance, telecommunication, transportation, ener-
gy, computer-assisted research, health care, and defense) that 
matter greatly to human well-being, safety, and knowledge. 
A cat that is not in the mood to purr and leaves the room 
with rump aloft will have little impact on humans’ fundamental 
information bearings. Depending on the context, a computer 
that refuses to interact or goes down unexpectedly may damage 
human interests in disastrous ways. AI communication is often 
designed to serve very central human information needs. To 
 
solely to persons, not animals such as orcas); Nonhuman Rights Project v. 
Presti, 124 A.D.3d 1334 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (denying petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus on behalf of chimpanzee on ground that the writ is only available 
when it would lead to immediate release from custody in New York); Nonhu-
man Rights Project v. Lavery, 124 A.D.3d 148, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (re-
jecting argument for legal personhood for chimpanzees); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., 
Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Personhood, 68 
FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (considering but rejecting legal rights for an-
imals on the ground that legal personhood is based on respect for dignity in-
terests of persons as members of the human race, not on cognitive abilities); 
see also Justin Marceau, If a Monkey Snaps a Selfie, Does He Own the Rights 
to His Own Photograph?, QUARTZ (Aug. 26, 2016), http://qz.com/767163/naruto 
-monkey-selfie-peta; David Post, The Monkey Selfie Is Back!, WASH. POST: 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/01/the-monkey-selfie-is-back/?utm_term= 
.b360f38cf8b0 (discussing the monkey “selfie” and why he cannot be declared 
the “author” of the image under copyright law). See generally STEVEN M. WISE, 
RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000) (arguing 
that animals are more appropriately persons, not things). For a thoughtful cri-
tique of Wise’s approach that touches on the conceptual and practical difficul-
ties of arguing by analogy from traditional rights bearers to new ones, see 
Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L.J. 527, 532 (2000) (reviewing 
STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE (2000)) (“[C]ognition and rights-
deservedness are not interwoven as tightly as Wise believes . . . .”). 
 106. See DE WAAL, supra note 102, at 52. 
 107. See NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE 2–3 (2014) (discussing how 
the future rate of growth of AI technologies is unclear, and that current 
growth models may greatly underestimate pace of change). 
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take but a few compelling examples, computer-generated in-
formation is crucial to air traffic control, a great deal of medical 
care, and the functioning of the stock market. Much as humans 
might like to know what cats, dolphins, octopuses, or capuchin 
monkeys are really telling them, humans are not literally lost 
or gravely imperiled if these meanings remain mysteries.108 
AI is designed to speak our language, and increasingly to 
do so in forms that look like us, walk like us, and talk like us. 
Animals, by contrast, generally do not participate in what hu-
mans understand to be genres of human communication.109 If 
courts and other decisionmakers justify the protection of AI be-
cause of human listeners, then the value of AI speech to human 
listeners is arguably higher than the value of animal 
“speech.”110 A decision to extend First Amendment coverage to 
AI speech thus may not require a decision to extend such cov-
erage to other nonhuman speakers. 
Another way to understand these distinctions is to return 
to the doctrine. From a doctrinal perspective, extending First 
Amendment coverage to AI speech does not necessarily require 
the coverage of much of animals’ output, because what animals 
produce often does not qualify as “speech” under the First 
Amendment.111 The doctrine on expressive conduct, arising in 
cases about burning flags and destroying draft cards, protects 
conduct performed with an intent to create a particularized 
message that is likely to be understood.112 Animals arguably 
 
 108. Cf. DE WAAL, supra note 102, at 234 (rejecting strong versions of hu-
man exceptionalism, and noting that “there is sound evidence that mental pro-
cesses associated with consciousness in humans, such as how we relate to the 
past and future, occur in other species as well” but conceding that we do not 
yet know enough to map the consciousness differences precisely). 
 109. Animals have their own distinctive features, which may overlap with 
human characteristics in ways that make them rich subjects of study as hu-
mans continue the hard work of understanding themselves. See MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS: WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE 137–60 
(2013) (discussing differences and similarities between animal and human 
compassion). 
 110. See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 717 (2000) (“If the state were to prohibit the use of 
[film] projectors without a license, First Amendment coverage would undoubt-
edly be triggered. This is not because projectors constitute speech acts, but be-
cause they are integral to the forms of interaction that comprise the genre of 
the cinema.”). 
 111. Similarly, if a wave washing up on the beach manages to produce ran-
dom patterns, those patterns are unlikely to be considered First Amendment 
“speech.” See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 112. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (noting that the 
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rarely do this. Some animal communication, of course, is rea-
sonably understood to create particularized messages—think: 
“feed me,” “someone is at the door,” or the more complex com-
munication of primates. But the animal-human communication 
relationship remains much thinner than the AI-human com-
munication relationship in ways that still make it easier, at 
least for now, to categorically exclude animal speakers from the 
First Amendment fold. 
III.  DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS TO AI 
FREE SPEECH COVERAGE   
We have demonstrated the theoretical difficulty of placing 
AI speakers wholly outside the First Amendment. A great deal 
of computer speech shares similarities with the human speech 
that courts already protect, especially when we emphasize ex-
pression’s value to listeners. Non-humanness does not neces-
sarily pose any insurmountable theoretical obstacle to strong 
AI rights. 
The law, however, is more than theory, and there are ar-
guably a host of practical and doctrinal hurdles to protecting 
strong AI speech. This Part explains how both prevailing doc-
trine and practical concerns also fail to eliminate the possibility 
of First Amendment coverage for AI speech, even while they 
identify important challenges and questions yet to be ad-
dressed. 
A. CAN AI SPEAKERS HAVE CULPABLE MENTAL STATES? 
First Amendment law sometimes requires intent to cause 
harm (or some other culpable mental state on the part of the 
speaker) as a condition of imposing liability for speakers’ harm-
ful expression.113 Courts justify such a requirement in an effort 
to protect valuable speech from the possible chilling effects of 
over-regulating less culpably motivated speakers.114 But this 
 
symbolism inherent in an object, the context of the situation, and an intention 
of expression can combine to create a protected form of expression). 
 113. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1172–85. 
 114. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that advocacy 
of illegal conduct is protected unless intentionally directed to inciting immi-
nent illegal action); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 
(1964) (holding that false assertions of fact regarding public officials are pro-
tected absent the speaker’s malicious mental state); Leslie Kendrick, Speech, 
Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1640 (2013) (ar-
guing that a stricter standard of liability would cause over-deterrence of 
speech). 
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creates a problem if the doctrine were to insulate AI speakers 
(but not human speakers) from liability because they lack 
provably culpable mental states. 
Say, for example, a computer produces defamatory 
speech—i.e., false factual claims that damage its target’s repu-
tation—about a public official. First Amendment doctrine cur-
rently requires a showing of the speaker’s actual malice before 
even demonstrably false political attacks may become actiona-
ble.115 How might a court determine whether an AI speaker act-
ed with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity of its 
assertions, or that it “entertained serious doubts as to the truth 
of [its] publication”?116 If the culpable intent cannot be shown, 
then liability arguably does not attach. 
Rather than insulating AIs’ defamatory speech from liabil-
ity altogether, courts could manage these complexities by alter-
ing the doctrine to prevent an AI windfall or otherwise mitigate 
the harmful effects of defamatory AI speech.117 Even contempo-
rary free speech doctrine, despite its growing emphasis on for-
malism over nuance, offers ways to address important regula-
tory concerns.118 
 
 115. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80; see also Meg Leta Ambrose & Ben 
M. Ambrose, When Robots Lie: A Comparison of Auto-Defamation Law, in 
IEEE WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED ROBOTICS AND ITS SOCIAL IMPACTS 56, 57 
(2014), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=7020980 (“[R]ob-
ots also serve as information and communication participants that may cause 
social unrest and individual harm which current legal regimes will find chal-
lenging. . . . [E]merging robotic systems pose novel issues concerning defama-
tion due to their unprecedented ability to experience the world and potential 
to communicate that experience to humans.”). 
 116. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
 117. For an analysis of the difficulties that already exist with mapping def-
amation law onto new social media, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER 
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 164–85 (1999); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & 
RonNell Andersen Jones, Of Reasonable Readers and Unreasonable Speakers: 
Libel Law in a Networked World, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 155, 156 (2016) 
(discussing the unique implications that social media has for the malice rule); 
Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515, 
527–38 (2015) (discussing implications of new technologies for reputation law); 
Robinson Meyer, Did Facebook Defame Megyn Kelly?: Which Is Another Way of 
Asking: Can a Bot Commit Libel?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www 
.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/08/did-facebook-defame-megyn-kelly/ 
498080 (discussing Facebook’s potential liability for a shift in the algorithm for 
its trending feature, which promoted a fake story that claimed Megyn Kelly 
endorsed Hillary Clinton for President). 
 118. See Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 369–
82 (2014) (discussing ways in which the Roberts Court has moved toward 
greater formalism in its approach to free speech, but noting the many ways in 
which existing doctrine still offers judges significant and necessary flexibility 
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Indeed, our legal tradition has long had to find ways to 
manage the challenges presented by new machines and other 
technology. Copyright law provides one such example of law’s 
adaptation to technology at the doctrinal edges. The concept of 
vicarious liability, with its focus on a potentially liable person’s 
benefit from and control of a copyright infringer, was initially 
poorly suited for the age of mass filesharing.119 Software dis-
tributors benefit from filesharing in more indirect ways than 
their physical world counterparts: through online advertise-
ments, for example, instead of rent or direct kickbacks. The el-
ement of control presents similar doctrinal challenges: software 
distributors can either easily control all users, exposing them-
selves to broad liability and accruing what can be high monitor-
ing costs, or can create situations of willful blindness. Over 
time, courts have (admittedly with serious struggles) figured 
out doctrinal ways to ascribe secondary liability to software dis-
tributors.120 The sheer scale of filesharing, balanced against 
fears of chilling technological development, resulted not in a re-
fusal to apply copyright law to new technologies, but in doctri-
nal development that made room for complicated debates about 
overarching policy concerns. Courts similarly may adapt First 
Amendment doctrine on its edges to address the challenges 
posed by AI speakers’ defamatory speech, even absent a prova-
bly culpable mental state. 
 
to address context-specific concerns). 
 119. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261–62 (9th Cir. 
1996) (explaining that the “concept of vicarious copyright liability . . . [is] an 
outgrowth of the agency principles of respondeat superior”). 
 120. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913 (2005) (holding filesharing software company Grokster liable for inducing 
copyright infringement); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 442 (1984) (explaining that for its maker to escape secondary liability, a 
technology must be “capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses”); 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 
filesharing software company Napster liable for user copyright infringement). 
But see Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2516 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“It will take years, perhaps decades, to determine which automat-
ed systems now in existence are governed by the traditional volitional-conduct 
test and which get the Aereo treatment. (And automated systems now in con-
templation will have to take their chances).”); Bruce E. Boyden, Aereo and the 
Problem of Machine Volition, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 485, 499–505 (discussing 
how technology muddies issues of responsibility in copyright infringement 
cases). 
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B. CAN AIS SUE OR BE SUED? 
Some practically minded skeptics have pointed out the dif-
ficulties in determining how an AI speaker could sue to protect 
its free speech rights, or be sued and punished for its imper-
missibly harmful speech.121 Here we offer an introduction to 
how an AI might sue or be sued, though we recognize that sig-
nificant challenges remain to be addressed. 
Samir Chopra and Laurence White have contributed great-
ly to efforts to think about how to operationalize legal rights 
and duties for AI.122 We again draw on their work in consider-
ing key practical questions that would arise should courts ex-
tend First Amendment coverage to AI speakers.123 Chopra and 
White note, and we agree, that AI need not have identical 
rights and obligations to humans.124 Additionally, legal frame-
works can be developed that would enable AI to sue and be 
sued. The existing category of “legal persons” already includes 
entities that hold a variety of legal (including constitutional) 
rights and duties—such as corporations, unions, municipalities, 
and even sailing vessels.125 These rights-holders are legal per-
sons, but do not possess human status. 
 
 121. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 46, at 1248–52. 
 122. See generally SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY 
FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS (2011) (suggesting a framework in 
which artificial agents are given legal personhood). 
 123. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1180–81. 
 124. For example, courts have treated corporations as holding “derivative” 
First Amendment rights to speak in ways that inform and benefit natural per-
sons, rather than holding rights for their own sake. See, e.g., Margaret M. 
Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional 
Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2015). Courts might similarly 
treat strong AI speakers only as derivative rights-holders rather than holding 
rights indistinguishable from those held by natural persons. 
 125. CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 122, at 157; see also Massaro & Norton, 
supra note 6, at 1180–81 (discussing rights and duties of entities that are not 
moral, natural, or human persons); Solum, supra note 46, at 1238–39 (explain-
ing how the term “person” is often used as synonymous with “human” for 
many purposes, but “[t]he question whether an entity should be considered a 
legal person is reducible to other questions about whether or not the entity can 
and should be made the subject of a set of legal rights and duties. The particu-
lar bundle of rights and duties that accompanies legal personhood varies with 
the nature of the entity. Both corporations and natural persons are legal per-
sons, but they have different sets of legal rights and duties”). For interesting 
work speculating about the future of Bitcoin and how “independently wealthy 
software” might sue and be sued, see Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Mod-
ern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 93 (2015); Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy 
Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 257 (2014). 
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As applied to AI, the first step in the progression of legal 
rights might be to treat AIs as dependent, not independent, le-
gal persons. This would permit their owners (or those who di-
rect or are assigned responsibility for them) to be sued for their 
allegedly harmful or otherwise illegal actions. As Chopra and 
White observe, “If legal systems can accord dependent legal 
personality to children, adults who are not of sound mind, cor-
porations, ships, temples, and even idols, there is nothing to 
prevent the legal system from according this form of legal per-
sonality to artificial agents.”126 Courts and regulators could fol-
low precedent that currently applies to corporations to estab-
lish these legal arrangements. 
The more complex and controversial step would be for AI to 
be granted wholly independent legal personhood. Chopra and 
White outline the criteria for independent legal personhood as 
follows: an independent legal person must have intellectual ca-
pacity and rationality; the ability to understand legal obliga-
tions; susceptibility to punishment and enforcement; the ability 
to form contracts; and the ability to control money.127 Sophisti-
cated AI could satisfy these criteria.128 Moreover, satisfaction of 
the theoretical criteria for independent legal personhood would 
enable those injured by AI speakers to pursue legal remedies 
against AI. 
But this does not mean these notions are static or that AI 
may not close the gap between human cognition and machine 
thinking and planning. Law could take into account the inani-
mate nature of the legal actor in crafting liability rules, in 
framing the elements of torts such as defamation, or in defining 
constitutional defenses to liability.129 With such adjustments, 
 
More of these issues surely are nigh, as blockchain technology (on which 
Bitcoin depends) makes its way to trade finance and elsewhere. See, e.g., Kim 
S. Nash, Dun & Bradstreet Tests Blockchain for Trade Finance, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 14, 2016), http://on.wsj.com/2ekRlct. 
 126. CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 122, at 160. For example, AI might be 
required to register and meet capital requirements necessary to meet its fi-
nancial duties and enable those who contract with AI to be on fair notice of 
AI’s economic capacities. Id. at 161–62. 
 127. Id. at 162–63. 
 128. Id. at 162–71. 
 129. See id. at 153–71, 186–91 (discussing various means by which strong 
AI could be held legally accountable, including for damages); see also Ambrose 
& Ambrose, supra note 115 (discussing possible adjustments in defamation 
law as AI becomes more autonomous). The European parliament is ahead of 
the curve on these matters, and has suggested regulations be drafted that may 
include a form of “electronic personhood” for AI. See Alex Hern, Give Robots 
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AI could be held legally accountable for its harms. Moreover, as 
we already are seeing with weak AI that can generate news 
stories that include false statements,130 the risk of defamatory 
harm from strong AI is likely to be profound. Courts will be mo-
tivated to redress the harms and to make doctrinal moves nec-
essary to do so. How might judicial remedies be crafted and en-
forced in such cases? AI cannot be imprisoned; but of course 
neither can corporations.131 Instead, an AI might be physically 
disabled, barred from future participation in certain economic 
transactions, deregistered, or have its assets seized.132 Shallow 
or empty-pocket AI actors may exist and thus limit the useful-
ness of damage remedies, but this is true of many judgment-
proof human actors as well. Injunctive and declaratory relief 
could be invoked against the AI speaker, just as it is invoked 
against human actors. Again, adjustments within the doctrine 
on speech protection could be made to account for the fact that 
the speaker is a computer, not a human being. 
As for rights enforcement, we can imagine scenarios—
especially given the interdependence of AI rights and listener-
based interests—in which AI legal rights organizations or other 
humans interested in protecting valuable AI communication 
would step in to assist AI with assertion of AI rights. Special-
ized AI lawyers could help implement legal rights and reme-
dies. Third-party standing rules that apply in federal court 
might allow interested human parties to assert the AI rights, 
along with their own. The more important the information pro-
duced and controlled by AI becomes, the more likely it will be 
that legal means of enforcing AI speech rights and responsibili-
ties will be developed. 
The question in all of these cases would be how to respond 
to the rights and remedies needs, given the functionality and 
capacities of the AI speaker. As the latter evolve, this would af-
fect how rights and remedies are crafted and enforced. In fact, 
considering the range of available punishments for AI might 
lead to discussions of the theoretical purposes of punishment—
 
“Personhood” Status, EU Committee Argues, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/january/12/give-robots 
-personhood-status-eu-committee-argues. 
 130. See Tim Adams, And the Pulitzer Goes to . . . a Computer, THE GUARD-
IAN (June 28, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/28/ 
computer-writing-journalism-artificial-intelligence. 
 131. See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 122, at 167 (comparing punishment 
of AI to that available for a corporation). 
 132. Id. at 167–68. 
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retribution, rehabilitation, constraint—much as considerations 
of AI speech rights have led us to reexamine free speech theory 
here. 
Key to these practical concerns is that humanness is not 
essential to legal personhood—even if, as surely will be the 
case, human needs may inspire the move to AI legal person-
hood, and even if humans may be necessary aids to legal en-
forcement of AI rights. AI rights and remedies thus may be en-
forceable. 
IV.  POTENTIAL LIMITS ON AI FREE SPEECH COVERAGE   
Among the most powerful objections to the notion of ex-
tending speech protections to strong AI is that such extension 
lacks limiting principles. We agree that the hardest problem 
lies here: If AI speech is covered by the First Amendment, how 
can the government perform important regulatory functions in 
the name of humans without running afoul of the First 
Amendment? 
This puzzle produces the greatest intellectual yield of the 
AI thought experiment. The claims we advance are evidence of 
an existing slippage problem: the Court’s contemporary free 
speech theory and doctrine already make it difficult to articu-
late convincing limiting principles. By emphasizing either a 
negative view of the First Amendment that seeks to constrain 
the government’s dangerous ability to regulate speech133 or pos-
itive views that emphasize the value of speech to its listeners,134 
current doctrine supports the coverage of speech regardless of 
its nontraditional source or form. Increasingly expansive First 
Amendment theories and practice have already evolved in a 
manner that permits further coverage extensions that may 
 
 133. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543–44 (2012) (restating 
the rule from Ashcroft v. ACLU that the First Amendment prohibits govern-
ment restriction of speech); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–70 
(2010) (“[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”). 
 134. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392–93 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“The [First] Amendment is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not 
speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from 
single individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associa-
tions of individuals, to incorporated associations of individuals . . . .”); First 
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (“The inherent worth of 
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend 
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or in-
dividual.”). 
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seem exceedingly odd, counterintuitive, or even dangerous.135 
Current free speech law—which many now argue has invited 
deployment of the First Amendment as an antiregulatory 
tool136—is the source of this challenge, rather than any techno-
logical change past, present, or future. 
The choice to extend the First Amendment to cover new 
sources and styles of speech inevitably involves both promise 
and peril. Extending constitutional protection to private activi-
ty is often a double-edged liberty sword: the greater the power 
of the private actor, the greater the risk that freedom for that 
actor will constrain the freedom of other, less powerful actors.137 
If courts do extend First Amendment coverage to AI speak-
ers, this move surely will invite calls for limiting principles. As 
this Part explains, contemporary free speech doctrine contains 
means by which courts could respond to dangers posed by AI 
speakers, though each presents its own difficulties. In short, in-
 
 135. See Christopher Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment 
Right To Promote Drugs Off-Label, 78 OHIO ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(discussing slippery slope implications of the increased use of free speech law 
to block FDA legislation); Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of 
First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1629 (2015) (“The 
opportunistic lawyer or client seeking a way of fighting against some form of 
regulation or prosecution can now have increased confidence that an argument 
from the First Amendment will not be received with political scorn or doctrinal 
incredulity.”); Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. TELE-
COMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 33–35 (2002) (discussing concerns about how in-
formation industries may invoke free speech coverage in ways that may un-
dermine regulatory goals). 
 136. For a sampling of the many thoughtful commentators who have dis-
cussed this trend, see Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2015) (“[W]hat has been called First 
Amendment opportunism, where litigants raise novel free speech claims that 
may involve the repackaging of other types of legal arguments [lead to] First 
Amendment expansionism, where the First Amendment’s territory pushes 
outward to encompass ever more areas of law.”); Robert Post & Amanda 
Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 167 (2015) 
(“It is no exaggeration to observe that the First Amendment has become a 
powerful engine of constitutional deregulation. The echoes of Lochner are pal-
pable [and likely to be heard] in matters ranging from public health to data 
privacy.”); Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story: Country of Origin Labeling and the 
First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 26 (2015) (“[T]he First Amend-
ment has become the new Lochner, used by profit-seeking actors to interfere 
with the regulatory state in a way that substantive due process no longer al-
lows.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commis-
sion? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1149, 1191 (2008) (discussing the role search engines play as choke 
points to access to information). 
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terpreting the First Amendment to cover strong AI speakers 
would not necessarily mean that human needs no longer mat-
ter to First Amendment analysis. In fact, such an interpreta-
tion may inspire more careful reflection about how to define 
and mitigate the harmful effects of covered speech, while pre-
serving its manifold benefits. 
A. COVERING AI SPEECH BUT NOT ITS CONDUCT 
The First Amendment covers speech, but not conduct. Even 
under the most generous listener-centered view of the First 
Amendment, government regulation of pure conduct triggers no 
freedom of speech problem, and typically triggers mere rational 
basis scrutiny. The government’s regulation of conduct that al-
so has expressive qualities normally triggers a form of interme-
diate scrutiny.138 Current doctrine also poses a speaker intent 
threshold that must be crossed: in general, only conduct that is 
intended by the actor to communicate and that is reasonably 
understood by onlookers to communicate normally qualifies as 
“speech” for constitutional purposes.139 
AI behavior—like human behavior—may fall under all of 
these categories: it may be speech, expressive conduct, or pure 
conduct. First Amendment protections also extend beyond 
speech and expressive conduct, to acts integral to well-accepted 
communications media,140 and to corollary or penumbral rights 
necessary for fundamental First Amendment protections.141 
Which category applies to a particular AI behavior will depend 
both on the specific behavior in question and the context in 
which government seeks to regulate it.142 
 
 138. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968). 
 139. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam). We 
say “normally” because we recognize that strong versions of a listener-centered 
approach to speech threaten to swallow up Spence’s speaker intent require-
ment. If the coverage focus is solely on output usefulness to the listener, then 
it becomes harder to see why speaker intent (like speaker shame, speaker dig-
nity, or speaker humanness) matters at all. All useful information, however 
created, should under current theory trigger the First Amendment. The AI 
problem, though, does not create these issues; it highlights them and thus 
might prompt courts to walk back this potentially boundless aspect of speech 
coverage, or seek to mitigate its effects in the ways we identify, or in other 
ways we may have missed. 
 140. See generally Post, supra note 110 (discussing how First Amendment 
protections could extend to encryption source code used to communicate ideas). 
 141. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965) (“Without those 
peripheral rights, the specific rights would be less secure.”). 
 142. See Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 36, at 1194 (noting 
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Because the speech/conduct distinction may provide a rea-
son to deny First Amendment protection to some of what algo-
rithms and machines produce, it already has triggered signifi-
cant scholarly examination. Scholars have concluded that while 
some machine outputs produced by present-day AI and other 
technologies constitute speech or should otherwise receive pro-
tection, other outputs do not.143 Strong AI information practices 
will similarly vary, and thus so will the determination of when 
AI information products (from computer code to 3D-printed ob-
jects to music to carrying the information content of others) are 
speech versus conduct.144 
 
that free speech treatment of information practices might vary depending on 
whether the practice involves data collection, analysis, use, disclosure, or 
sale); Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things 
They Carry, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57, 62–63 (2013) (discussing constitutional 
implications of data recording); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and 
the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right To Record, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 335, 408–09 (2011) (arguing that the First Amendment protects a 
right to record). 
 143. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1186–88 (summarizing these 
arguments). But see NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 84–90 (2015) (critiquing the “data is 
speech” argument on grounds that it asks the wrong question and risks doom-
ing too much worthy regulation); Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “In-
formation as Speech,” 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761, 790–801 (2016) (critiquing the 
doctrinal trend of treating computer code and other code-dependent technolo-
gies as speech for First Amendment purposes on the ground that this coverage 
will have the eventual effect of diluting protection of core First Amendment 
speech). This obviously is not a new challenge, as free speech theorists have 
long struggled over the evasive (and ultimately vanishing) line between speech 
and conduct, even as they recognize the line still matters. The “computer out-
puts-as-speech versus conduct” debate provides a modern application of an en-
during and well-rehearsed characterization problem that is central to free 
speech theory and practice. 
 144. An example of how context matters arose in the recent controversy 
over whether broadband providers could be treated as common carriers. U.S. 
Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The court rejected the 
compelled speech objections of the providers on the ground that the providers 
covered by the regulation exercised no editorial control over the content, and 
thus were not engaging in speech themselves. Id. at 741. The court stated as 
follows: 
The Supreme Court has explained that the First Amendment comes 
“into play” only where “particular conduct possesses sufficient com-
municative elements,” that is, when an “intent to convey a particular-
ized message [is] present, and in the surrounding circumstances the 
likelihood [is] great that the message would be understood by those 
who viewed it,” [t]he absence of any First Amendment concern in the 
context of common carriers rests on the understanding that such enti-
ties, insofar as they are subject to equal access mandates, merely fa-
cilitate the transmission of the speech of others rather than engage in 
speech in their own right. 
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We do not distinguish among these products here. We 
merely note that covering AI speech under the First Amend-
ment will not insulate all of its outputs as speech, any more 
than treating humans as rights-bearing speakers converts all 
human behavior to speech, or insulates all of their speech out-
puts from government regulation. 
B. PROTECTING LISTENERS AND OTHER HUMANS FROM 
HARMFUL AI SPEECH 
Even when an AI information product is covered as speech, 
the government still may be able to regulate in the name of cer-
tain kinds of harms. In other words, even when courts recog-
nize speech as covered by the First Amendment, this does not 
always mean that courts will protect such speech from the gov-
ernment’s regulation.145 Courts will likely bring the constitu-
tional hammer down differently on some AI informational 
products than on others, based on the type of information prod-
uct, context, and the nature of the harms at stake.146 Courts 
might be persuaded that government regulation of covered AI 
speech meets intermediate and sometimes even strict scrutiny 
where the harms of AI speech appear grave enough and the 
regulations are sufficiently tailored. 
A number of thoughtful commentators have documented 
the potential harms of algorithmic speech products, due to 
computers’ jaw-dropping speed and reach.147 These harms in-
clude deception, coercion, and discrimination. Strong AI will 
only deepen these concerns. 
 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, 
and Communicating: Determining What “Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 
DUKE L.J. 1673, 1689–91 (2011) (arguing that mere transmission is not 
speech). 
 145. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction 
between speech that is covered and how much protection speech will receive). 
 146. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right To Record, 97 
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4) (on file with authors) (“My 
central claim is that the contours of the protected right to record are defined 
by the privacy harms that the right potentially causes. Understanding the 
right to record is possible only by properly articulating the privacy interests at 
stake. This claim stands even as the Supreme Court in recent cases has re-
peatedly disavowed balancing speech against other nonspeech harms.”). 
 147. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. 
REV. 785, 790–96 (2015) (describing how robots’ speech may include fraud, 
manipulation, and invasions of privacy); Wu, supra note 12, at 1496–1503 (de-
scribing the range of potential harms of computer-generated speech that invite 
regulation). 
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For one thing, strong AI will have social valence: AI may 
appear to be a real social actor in ways that trigger and manip-
ulate intrinsic human reactions.148 At the same time, even 
strong AI will likely still lack human emotions, sensitivity to 
social nuance, or the ability to feel shame. A listener may intui-
tively trust AI as though it were a human actor, without under-
standing the differences or risks at hand. The field of Human 
Robot Interaction (HRI) specifically studies how humans react 
to robots, and how such reactions may be deliberately triggered 
by machine design.149 
As discussed in Part II.B, an AI speaker’s lack of emotions 
may not prevent its coverage under the First Amendment.150 
Nevertheless, AIs’ inability to internalize complex social cues or 
feel shame or equivalently binding emotions might lead to a 
greater government interest in regulating AI speech, based on 
a greater likelihood, or greater impact, of its harms to listeners. 
When Hello Barbie151 tries to get a child to buy her a new outfit, 
the government’s regulatory interest might well take into ac-
count both Barbie’s canny ability to manipulate the child’s at-
tachment and emotions, and Barbie’s inhuman inability to feel 
any guilt about doing so. Combined, these features may mean 
that Hello Barbie as a speaker may threaten significant and 
categorically distinctive harm to a child, and that the harm she 
causes over time may be different in degree or even—if such in-
teractions, for example, prove to be physiologically addictive by 
 
 148. Calo, supra note 16, at 545 (discussing how humans react to anthro-
pomorphic robots). 
 149. Laura Dattaro, Bot Looks Like a Lady, SLATE (Feb. 4, 2015), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/robot_gender_is_it_ 
bad_for_human_women.html; Margot E. Kaminski, What the Scarlett Johans-
son Robot Says About the Future, SLATE (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/technology/future_tense/2016/04/what_the_scarlett_johansson_robot_ 
says_about_the_future.html (“Robot designers know we respond to anthropo-
morphic features . . . . They study the ways, both for good and for bad, that ro-
bot design can affect or elicit human behavior. In one study, men were more 
likely to donate money to a female robot. In another, users disclosed more or 
less information about dating, based on whether a robot was male or female. 
This is no doubt true of race, as well; most robots currently have a Eurocentric 
design.”). 
 150. See supra notes 88–100 and accompanying text (discussing the fact 
that emotional capacity of the speaker is not part of First Amendment analy-
sis). 
 151. See Irina D. Manta & David S. Olsen, Hello Barbie: First They Will 
Monitor You, Then They Will Discriminate Against You. Perfectly, 67 ALA. L. 
REV. 135, 136–37, 179 n.232 (2015) (discussing how built-in hardware and 
software permits these devices to interact with other devices). 
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design—in kind from those that a human speaker might in-
flict.152 
Of course, were courts to consider seriously this harm-on-
stilts aspect of AI speech, they also may be compelled to revisit 
their profound agnosticism about comparably devastating ef-
fects when the speaker is a shameless or exceptionally cruel 
human. This is yet another way in which AI speech problems 
can shed new light on current doctrine and theory. 
Adding to the potential harms of AI speech, computer pro-
grams are known to be far from neutral sources or decision-
makers. Bias and discrimination may be built into programs, 
whether intentionally or accidentally; technology is not value-
neutral, but value-based.153 The possibility that AI speech 
threatens significant harms to human listeners through such 
discrimination suggests a strong governmental interest in regu-
lation. Much as free speech doctrine has made room for the 
regulation of harassing speech that deprives its targets of em-
ployment and educational opportunities, so too may it make 
room for regulation of AI speech to further the end of prevent-
ing discrimination.154 Judicial limits on AI speech will depend 
on what AI speech does (and how, and to whom). 
Courts already attend to the harms that expression poses 
to listeners, as current doctrine recognizes a number of speech 
environments in which listeners’ First Amendment interests 
are paramount. Listeners’ interests can justify expression’s 
 
 152. See, e.g., Zoe Kleinman, Are We Addicted to Technology?, BBC (Aug. 
31, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33976695. 
 153. See Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 
14 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYS. 330 (1996); see also FRANK PASQUALE, 
THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY 
AND INFORMATION 29–35 (2015) (expressing concerns about data-driven socie-
ty, given the opacity of data’s origins and destinations, the risk of bias and er-
ror within them, and possible cascade effects if information in one piece of 
software is repeated in systems throughout the economy); Solon Barocas & 
Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677 
(2016); Kim, supra note 19 (noting that data and algorithms can discriminate); 
Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 
25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial 
-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html (“Sexism, racism and other forms of 
discrimination are being built into the machine-learning algorithms that un-
derlie the technology behind many ‘intelligent’ systems that shape how we are 
categorized and advertised to.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2298 (1999) (discussing how the law should adapt to in-
centivize employers to make the workplace less hostile to less-powerful em-
ployees). 
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First Amendment coverage, where such coverage serves listen-
ers’ autonomy, enlightenment, and self-governance interests. 
But sometimes listeners’ interests call for the regulation—not 
just the protection—of speech. Courts thus might uphold nar-
rowly tailored restrictions on AI speech to privilege human lis-
teners’ interests in informed choices, or in avoiding the harms 
of coercion, deception, or discrimination.155 If coverage of AI 
speech is based in large part on listeners’ interests in that 
speech, then the government may be able to regulate the 
speech to protect human listeners when the interests of the AI 
speaker and human listener conflict. 
As an example, recall that the Court has explained that 
commercial speech is worthy of First Amendment protection 
because of its informational value to consumers as listeners.156 
Commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to an 
illegal activity frustrates listeners’ informational interests and 
thus can be banned outright without running afoul of the First 
Amendment.157 For related reasons, courts have permitted the 
government substantial leeway to require commercial speakers 
to make truthful disclosures because such disclosures often 
serve listeners’ informational interests.158 
As another example, courts often permit the regulation of 
professionals’ speech to their patients and clients by prohibit-
ing lies and misrepresentations to such listeners and by requir-
 
 155. See Norton, supra note 14, at 55–60 (explaining how First Amendment 
theory and doctrine often support the content-based regulation of speech in 
certain relationships where listeners experience information or power disad-
vantage or are otherwise comparatively vulnerable). 
 156. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“[T]he extension of First Amendment protec-
tion to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of 
the information such speech provides.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citi-
zen Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (1976) (emphasizing the 
value of “the free flow of commercial information” to individual consumers and 
the public more generally). 
 157. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980). 
 158. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (holding that disclosure requirements that 
are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing consumer decep-
tion do not violate commercial speakers’ First Amendment rights). The Court 
applies intermediate scrutiny to laws regulating truthful and non-misleading 
commercial speech on the premise that such speech—although still of relative-
ly low value—can helpfully inform individuals about their choices in the com-
mercial realm. Id. 
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ing truthful disclosures of those listeners’ options and risks.159 A 
number of commentators have proposed similar approaches in 
the information technology context, suggesting the regulation 
of those information entities to which internet audiences en-
trust important information or functions.160 Courts also have 
protected listeners under the “captive audience” doctrine, which 
applies when listeners cannot avoid or escape speech.161 
Listener-based justifications would not mean limitless gov-
ernment power to adopt the kinds of speech regulation the 
Court historically has found most suspect. The government 
might be tempted to censor critical or inconvenient AI speech 
for malign motives that have long invoked First Amendment 
concerns. In those cases, listener interests and negative theory 
would align to bar the government’s efforts to target AIs’ view-
point for censorious purposes, as is the case when the govern-
ment conducts viewpoint-based regulation of human speech. 
Drawing the line between these two scenarios—when lis-
tener and AI speaker interests align, and when they are in ten-
sion—will at times be difficult. Indeed, our AI thought problem 
exposes this difficulty vividly. Contemplating the possibility of 
 
 159. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 248–50 (2013). 
The role of the First Amendment as a brake on occupational licensing has 
been a source of considerable recent scholarly attention. See, e.g., Marc Jona-
than Blitz, Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 681 (2016); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238 
(2016); Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 
HARV. L. REV. F. 183 (2015); Eugene Volokh, Professional-Client Speech and 
the First Amendment, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/11/20/ 
professional-client-speech-and-the-first-amendment. 
 160. See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 36, at 1186 (“Be-
cause of their special power over others and their special relationship to oth-
ers, information fiduciaries have special duties to act in ways that do not harm 
the interests of the people whose information they collect, analyze, use, sell, 
and distribute. . . . And because of their different position, the First Amend-
ment permits somewhat greater regulation of information fiduciaries than it 
does for other people and entities.”); Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 903–04 
(describing the “inescapable information asymmetry between users and search 
engines” that should be understood to trigger duties of loyalty and care); Neil 
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 462 (2016) (“Trust in information relationships re-
quires an affirmative obligation of honesty to correct misinterpretations and to 
actively dispel notions of mistaken trust.”). 
 161. Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled 
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 946 (2009) (“[T]he question is not whether the 
audience can avoid the message by leaving a particular location . . . but 
whether they should have to.”). 
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AI speakers may lead to a more careful identification of the role 
of listeners’ interests in all free speech puzzles, not just those in 
which AI is the speaker. 
Finally, our AI thought experiment illuminates a long-
central and recurring problem in First Amendment doctrine: 
how to distinguish speech-related from non-speech-related 
harms.162 In the case of expressive conduct, such as draft card-
burning, the government can often regulate expression as long 
as it aims the regulation at a non-speech-related harm, and ad-
equately tailors its attempt.163 For example, the government 
cannot regulate flag-burning to prevent “the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable,” but could regulate burning flags and other ob-
jects where fire causes physical harm to others.164 
Many of the information products that AI produce likely 
will be characterized not as pure speech, but as expressive con-
duct or something similar, much as computer code has been 
subjected to forms of intermediate scrutiny to distinguish pro-
tected expression from its regulable non-speech impacts.165 If 
the government attempts to regulate such mixed-impact infor-
mation products, then the question becomes what counts as a 
speech-related (and thus content-based and censorious) motive, 
and what does not. Does privacy count as a speech-related in-
terest? Does cybersecurity? Can the government prevent Hello 
Barbie from doing a particular dance, or making particular 
 
 162. See TRIBE, supra note 10; Brown, supra note 10; see also Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (“[W]here ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements 
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important govern-
mental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental lim-
itations on First Amendment freedoms, we have limited the applicability of 
O’Brien’s relatively lenient standard to those cases in which ‘the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.’” (citations omit-
ted)). 
 163. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968). 
 164. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414; id. at 403 (“If the State’s regulation is not 
related to expression, then the less stringent standard we announced in Unit-
ed States v. O’Brien for regulations of noncommunicative conduct controls. If it 
is, then we are outside of O’Brien’s test, and we must ask whether this interest 
justifies Johnson’s conviction under a more demanding standard.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 165. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational 
Speech and the First Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 795, 816 (2013) 
(“[C]ourts have sometimes turned to an intermediate standard of scrutiny 
arising out of United States v. O’Brien as the basis of an analytical framework 
in cases involving code.”). 
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movements, or require particular elements in her design in the 
name of preventing injury?166 
This is, again, not an AI-specific problem. Recent cases 
have complicated the line between speech-related (or content-
based) regulation and permissible non-speech-related regula-
tion.167 Yet the government clearly can regulate expressive con-
duct under intermediate scrutiny to prevent physical harms to 
others. Extending First Amendment coverage to AI speech thus 
would not disable the government from regulating such speech 
to address physical harms, such as crashing into others, caus-
ing particularly loud noises, or otherwise putting users at phys-
ical risk. Current doctrine suggests, however, that naming the 
subject of regulation (e.g., “this regulation applies to pharma-
ceutical companies’ AI”) poses the risk that the regulation will 
be characterized as content-based, and thus inappropriately 
censorious.168 Other recent doctrine, however, suggests the gov-
ernment can name and thus target particular physical spaces 
for regulation (like the physical areas around abortion provid-
ers or embassies), when expressive conduct or even pure speech 
negatively impacts the behavior of others in that space for rea-
sons unrelated to the content of the speech.169 
Distinguishing regulations that address speech-related 
harms from those that address non-speech-related harms is a 
central free speech question of the algorithmic age that our 
thought experiment helps illuminate. Extending speech protec-
tion to strong AI does not make all information that AI produc-
es immune from regulation. It instead highlights the line-
drawing work courts already must do to distinguish appropri-
ate government regulation from censorious attempts. 
Contemporary free speech law offers courts opportunities 
for limiting the negative impact of AI expression even if they 
wrap AI speakers into the constitutional fold. Yet the first 
 
 166. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289–96 (2000) (applying 
the test from O’Brien to a city ordinance prohibiting nude dancing because 
nude dancing can be a form of expression). 
 167. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (invalidating an Arizo-
na law that set restrictions on sign size based on whether the signs were 
“Temporary Directional Signs,” “Ideological Signs,” or “Political Signs” as con-
tent-based); Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (subjecting a Vermont 
statute, which prevented pharmacies from selling client data to markets, to 
heightened scrutiny due to its burden on speech). 
 168. IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 563–71 (finding that the particularity of the 
regulation contributed to the finding that it was content-based). 
 169. Kaminski, supra note 146, at 53–56. 
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move of granting AI speakers First Amendment coverage would 
be a powerful one. It would place AI speech into the constitu-
tional rights box, where government regulations typically face 
elevated judicial scrutiny. Full protection of such speech from 
the government’s regulation may not inexorably follow, but the 
government would bear the weighty burden of justifying its 
regulation. 
Our point is this: insofar as a primary basis for protecting 
AI speech rests on the value of expression to human listeners, 
free speech protection for strong AIs need not rob the First 
Amendment of a human focus. Absent a human speaker, gov-
ernment still may attend to the dangers to listeners and other 
humans. First Amendment coverage need not mean protection 
in all instances. The prospect of free speech rights for strong AI 
speakers might encourage useful clarification of the roles of 
human listeners and of speech harms in U.S. free speech theory 
and doctrine today. 
CONCLUSION 
We have explained how foundational free speech theory 
and doctrine present surprisingly few barriers to First 
Amendment coverage of strong AI speech. In so doing, we also 
have considered the powerful counterarguments to such cover-
age. 
The assertion that strong AI speakers might be covered by 
the First Amendment makes many uncomfortable, perhaps jus-
tifiably so. Some worry that in a system of rights, humanness 
does—or at least should—matter. Others fear that a failure to 
insist on humanness means that free speech rights must also 
extend to our cats and dogs. More practically minded critics 
point out the difficulties in determining how an AI could sue (to 
vindicate its free speech rights) or be sued (for the harm inflict-
ed by its regulated speech). Still others observe the challenges 
that would arise in areas of First Amendment law that focus on 
a speaker’s mental state in determining coverage or liability. 
We take these concerns seriously. Although we conclude 
that none of them settles the matter, we also agree that uncer-
tainties will and should remain. 
Failing to extend the First Amendment to cover AI speech 
invites the risk that government will suppress such speech in 
ways that deprive human listeners of valuable expression or 
otherwise compromise important free speech interests. At the 
same time, AI speech can pose substantial dangers to those 
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same human listeners through its potential power, speed, and 
scope. Free speech theory and doctrine can thus provide sup-
port for the regulation, as well as the protection, of strong AI 
speakers. Courts may craft adjustments to doctrine to address 
such expression’s potential harms, as well as its value, to hu-
man listeners. Such challenges are neither altogether new nor 
necessarily insuperable. Legal regimes have long adapted to 
the pressures of emerging technologies. 
We close by turning the AI thought experiment on its head: 
What does the prospect of First Amendment coverage of strong 
AIs’ speech teach us about the limits and possibilities of cur-
rent free speech law? 
Among other things, it forces us to revisit questions about 
whether and when courts should permit government to address 
important interests in compensating and preventing the 
regulable harms of expression without unduly treading on free 
speech toes. The steady extension of free speech coverage to ar-
eas once thought to be immune from First Amendment scrutiny 
has exacerbated this longstanding challenge, and our AI 
thought experiment shows some of the challenges yet to come. 
The hardest judicial work likely will lie here. 
The challenges posed by coverage of AI speech may en-
courage the Court to build on listener-centered rationales to de-
rive limiting principles within zones where free speech cover-
age applies. If it cares about listeners—and this Court plainly 
does—it may consider how information-regulation policies can 
both enhance and compromise listeners’ autonomy, enlighten-
ment, and self-governance interests long thought to lie at the 
core of the First Amendment. 
Finally, we have described the logical implications of the 
Court’s existing First Amendment framework, but have not in-
sisted on its inevitability or even its wisdom. The normative 
and practical difficulties in extending free speech rights to 
strong AI speakers may force reexamination of the contempo-
rary turn in free speech law and theory that makes future cov-
erage of AI speech plausible. As AI evolves, human judges and 
policymakers must muddle through the unfolding challenges 
and find means to address them. Future constitutional law 
scholars then will debate the merits of their handiwork (per-
haps aided by AI enhancements in conducting their anal-
yses).170 However this work develops, it must be mindful of the 
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escalating power of AI over information that humans need to 
survive. The information stakes already are extremely high, 
and quickly mounting. We should start thinking—Siri-ously—
about the implications of AI advances for a variety of legal do-
mains, including freedom of expression. 
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